The French rule in Africa has been characterised by brutality and the use of unequal power against those unable to defend themselves; in Rwanda, the Congo, Cameroon, Algeria, Chad; the Ivory Coast; the massacre of the Senegalese riflemen at Thiaroye; the brutal and barbaric repression of the insurrection in Madagascar; the shooting of Dimbokro (to name but a few). Over 800,000 Africans died in Rwanda; 45,000 Africans died in one weekend in Setif, Algeria at the hands of French forces. In almost all these cases these were massacres of unarmed Africans by well-armed and equipped French soldiers and their mercenary allies in the Foreign Legion. The horrors outside the Hotel Ivoire were part of a long tradition of French atrocities in Africa.

One may well ask what allows the French to act without the normal restraints which govern the interaction of civilised people. How can they be so callous, so arrogant and so oblivious to the effects of their actions on the opinion of the world community? The answer doesn’t lie in the economics of the relationship. One can make a case that French commercial interests are threatened by non-French involvement in African economies, but this is no recipe or excuse for the brutality of French military activity. The root and intensity of the reaction can be found in two complementary areas. The first is that France’s role in Africa is bound up in the grandeur of France’s position in the world. France claims to be a world power on the basis of (a) having nuclear weapons; (b) occupying a seat on the UN Security Council; and (c) its continuing presence in sub-Saharan Africa. France has is claque of francophone states who laud it, support it and follow its lead in the UN and regional bodies. The global reach of French military power extends from the Rainbow Warrior in New Zealand to Cocody in Abidjan. The fiction of France’s importance is bound up in its position in Africa. Its economy is smaller than California’s; its military might is only mighty when compared with Niger, Chad or Gabon; its position as a world language has largely dissolved; and its cultural influences are negligible at best. Only its African ‘ex-colonies’ make it important. France’s national myth of world status is intimately tied in with its presence in Africa.

The second aspect of this policy towards Africa is that it is the personal preserve of the President of the Republic and his team of two or three advisers and assistants. African policy is the policy of the Presidential palace. Men like Foccart, Pasqua and now de Bonnecorse translate the President’s wishes and whims into an African policy. The National Assembly, the political parties and the ministries are marginally involved and certainly don’t get to vote on African policies. French African policies are French Presidential policies. The ego and stature of the President is intertwined with the African policy. So, if there is a sick, twisted and vainglorious man as President, one can logically expect a sick, twisted and vainglorious African policy unfettered by reason, decency or restraint.

The war of the French against the Ivory Coast is a war by Jacques Chirac against the Ivory Coast. It was his fit of pique which ordered the French ‘peacekeepers’ to attack and destroy the Ivory Coast air force. It was his order to send over a hundred tanks to surround the Hotel d’Ivoire and President Gbagbo’s house. It was his decision to allow his soldiers to open fire on a crowd of singing youths, totally unarmed and non-threatening, seeking only to stop the French from making a coup or killing President Gbagbo. These Young Patriots gave up their lives for their country and scores of others were wounded because of Jacques Chirac.

By the time of the Abidjan Massacre the French had already shown their bad faith and willingness to promote and sustain civil disorder in the Ivory Coast. Their support and nurture of the rebellion unleashed on a peaceful society the horrors of the Liberian and Sierra Leonean civil wars, as the crazed fighters from these wars poured across the borders to assist the rebel troops, under the guidance and support of the French Army. France’s close ties with and domination of Ivory Coast’s neighbours (Mali and Burkina Faso) provided staging areas for the rebels and a place for the delivery of weapons and ammunition. French ‘peacekeepers’ took time off from robbing banks, abusing Ivorian women, and murdering Ivorian civilians to plan coups and uprisings by the rebels. Their only restraint was the incompetence and cowardice of the rebels. Their role was clearly defined, once they had put themselves under UN jurisdiction. They were to keep the peace, not to wage war. This did not stop them from defying the UN mandate by destroying the Ivory Coast air force; occupying the Abidjan airport and shooting down innocent and unarmed civilians.

Surely the best legacy of the heroes who died and were wounded on those dark days in November 2004 would be for the French to pull their forces out of the Ivory Coast as soon as possible. Their mandate expires in January 2006. It should not be renewed. The French have shown over and over, that they are unfit as peacekeepers, with or without UN sanction. To avoid temptation and to avoid following their baser instincts they should leave the Ivory Coast at once. With all the rioting and disorder in France, they are needed at home. There departure must be encouraged.

Dr. Gary K. Busch, an American Professor of political science, journalist and businessman trading with Africa, based in London, U.K. He is also a co-author of a book on the French war in Africa: Antoine Ahua, Mamadou Koulibaly & Gary K. Bush - "La guerre de la France contre la Côte d’Ivoire".

Dr. Gary K. Busch, diplôme en B.A. de l'Université de Cornell, diplômé en CIS de l'Ecole Londonienne d'économie, il est titulaire d'un Ph. D obtenu ŕ l'Université americaine de Washington DC M. Busch est professeur et ancien directeur de département de l'Université de Hawaď.